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Introduction 
"I think Plessy v. Ferguson was right and should be reaffirmed." 
William Rehnquist, Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court 
(quoted in Orfield 1996a, 10). 
Over the last century, few issues have generated more controversy in U.S. 
metropolitan areas than school "desegregation." "Busing," "magnet schools," 
and "controlled choice" have become familiar academic and popular vocabulary 
and reflect a long history of struggles to integrate schools and ameliorate racial 
inequalities. These issues are particularly significant in Kansas City, Missouri, 
the site of one of the nation's most controversial and expansive desegregation 
orders during the 1980s and 1990s. Racial segregation in housing and schools 
have been defining features of the Kansas City metropolitan area for over a cen-
tury. The Kansas City, Missouri School District (KCMSD) was racially segre-
gated from its creation in September 1867. In the ensuing decades, school offi-
cials provided separate education facilities for blacks and whites, and the city 
and metropolitan area developed clearly defined patterns of racial segregation. 
By 1940, the block-level "index of dissimilarity" for nonwhite-white segrega-
tion stood at 88.0, indicating that at least 88 percent of all minorities would have 
had to change their place of residence in Kansas City to live in an integrated 
neighborhood.1 This high segregation level remained relatively fixed through-
out the postwar era, ranging from 91.3 in 1950 and to 90.8 in 1960, and 88.0 by 
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1970(Sorensen,Taeuber,andHollmgsworth 1975,128-30). In the 1990s,Massey 
and Denton (1993, 75-7) identified Kansas City as one of the nation's 
hypersegregated metropolitan areas due to the high degree of segregation in 
housing patterns on a range of indices.2 While the index of dissimilarity for the 
metropolitan area declined slightly to 73.15 in 1990 and 69.12 in 2000, Kansas 
City continues to be one of the most segregated metropolitan areas in the nation 
(Mumford Center 2001), a situation that is reinforced by continuing 
suburbanization, inner city disinvestment, and school segregation.3 
This paper has two goals. First, I point to the missed opportunities in the 
century-long struggle to dismantle the racially unequal system of education in 
Kansas City and discuss the enduring legacy of racial segregation in local schools. 
Drawing on archival data, newspaper reports, oral histories, and testimony and 
exhibits from the landmark Kansas City school desegregation case, Jenkins v. 
Missouri? I focus on the role of the State of Missouri in creating racially segre-
gated schools before Brown; the impact of Kansas City, Missouri School District 
(KCMSD) school board policies and administrative decisions in reinforcing seg-
regation after Brown; and the enduring consequences of these segregative ac-
tions by the state and local governments. U.S. Supreme Court decisions over the 
last two decades have forgotten or refuse to acknowledge the historical basis of 
racial segregation or consider how the vestiges of the past continue to affect the 
present. In the famous 1974 Detroit school desegregation case, Milliken v. Bra-
dley, Justice Potter Stewart, in a concurring opinion for the 5-4 majority, asserted 
that social inequalities associated with racial residential segregation had been 
caused by "unknown and perhaps unknowable factors" {Milliken v. Bradley, 418 
U.S. 717, 756 n. 2 [1974]). In the 1995 Kansas City school desegregation case, 
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor claimed that racial residential segregation was a 
result of "natural, if unfortunate, demographic forces" {Missouri v. Jenkins, 63 
U.S.L.W 4486 [1995]). U.S. Supreme Court decisions on school desegregation 
in the 1990s reflected an entrenched ideology that has come to accept racial 
segregation as natural or accidental, inevitable, and unsolvable. The historical 
narrative developed in this paper points to the key events and decisions underly-
ing the origin of school segregation, identifies crucial turning points and missed 
opportunities in the struggle to desegregate schools, and reveals how a historical 
trajectory set long ago still molds contemporary responses to the problems of 
racial segregation in schools. 
My second goal is to illustrate the reflexive relationship between schools 
and housing, especially the impact of school administrative decisions on racial 
housing patterns. I argue that, in addition to housing discrimination and segrega-
tion, school segregation was a critical factor in contributing to the creation of 
residential apartheid in Kansas City, Missouri. A number of scholars and court 
decisions argue that policy decisions by school boards and administrators, and 
the location of schools, are crucial to understanding the movement of racial groups 
and development of residential segregation. In the famous Swann v. Charlotte-
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Mecklenburg Board of Education case in 1971, the Supreme Court ruled that 
"People gravitate toward school facilities, just as schools are located in response 
to the needs of the people. The location of schools may thus influence the pat-
terns of residential development of a metropolitan area " Orfield (1996c) and 
Taeuber (1979), among others, have pointed to the reciprocal relationship be-
tween schools and housing, arguing that schools can have racial housing conse-
quences and housing policies can have racial school consequences. This case 
study contributes to this literature by explaining how school administrative deci-
sions affected the timing, pace, and direction of racial movement in Kansas City, 
Missouri, during the twentieth century. I focus first on the state of Missouri's 
pre-1954 inter-district system of locating dual schools and segregating African 
American children. Next, I explore post-1954 segregative school decisions that 
impelled whites to move out of urban neighborhoods while channeling blacks 
into the southeast section of the city. 
Finally, I examine the significance of Kansas City, Missouri's school deseg-
regation plan and the 1995 U.S. Supreme Court decision that effectively ended 
the desegregation effort that had begun in 1984. Despite the efforts of city lead-
ers and civil rights activists, virtually every attempt in the last three decades to 
seek a metropolitan-wide solution to the problem of school segregation has met 
with fierce opposition from suburban residents, property owners, and political 
elites. More broadly, since the 1960s, the predominantly white suburbanites have 
shown little or no interest in addressing urban problems such as racially segre-
gated public schools, concentrated poverty, blighted housing, and financial dis-
investment—problems connected to neighborhoods now inhabited by racial mi-
norities (Gotham 1998a; 1998b). As I show, the combination of the existence of 
the Kansas/Missouri state line that bifurcates the metropolitan area, interdistrict 
fragmentation, and the absence of a significant cross-district desegregation plan 
has reinforced racial segregation in housing and schools. Exploring the impact 
of schools and school administrative decisions on racial housing patterns is im-
portant in an era where the mechanisms of preserving racial segregation have 
become more covert and subtle, and the racial segregation of African American 
and Hispanic students is increasing (Orfield, Bachmeier, James, and Eitle 1997). 
School Segregation From Plessy (1896) to Brown (1954) 
During the Civil War, the Kansas and Missouri state line that bisects the 
Kansas City metropolitan area was a front of intense warfare between pro- and 
anti-slavery groups. The pro-slavery forces in Missouri, called the "bushwhack-
ers," sought to impose slavery on Kansas through coercion and ballot stuffing. 
On the Kansas side, free-state proponents, the "Jayhawkers," sought admission 
of the state to the Union with slavery prohibited. This North/South conflict also 
affected public schools.5 As was typical throughout the South, the Missouri state 
constitution required segregated schools for whites and blacks. Indeed, Missouri 
was the northern-most of the states to require separate schools for whites and 
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blacks by state constitution. Under mandates enacted in 1865,1868,1869,1875, 
and 1889, the State of Missouri made it a criminal offense for "any colored child 
to attend a white [public] school" (1889 Mo. Laws 226) and extended the bar to 
private schools in 1909 (1909 Mo. Laws 770, 790, 820). The Missouri Supreme 
Court upheld the constitutionality of these provisions in 1891 and, in 1910, the 
State Attorney General alerted all Missouri school districts that the State would 
prosecute school officials operating racially integrated schools. Until 1929, the 
state of Missouri exempted school districts from providing schools for African 
American children whose enumeration dropped to below fifteen and required 
school districts to eliminate African American schools if attendance fell below 
eight. After 1929, the State gave school districts the option to discontinue schools 
for blacks, no matter what their enumeration.6 
The development of racially segregated schools in Kansas City stemmed 
from a series of discriminatory government actions, U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sions, and dramatic demographic shifts during the late-nineteenth and early-twen-
tieth century (for overviews, see Gotham 1997, chapter 1 ; Clevenger 1941 ; Glaab 
1993; Schirmer and McKinzie 1982,41-60). Table 1 shows total and black popu-
lation for Kansas City, Missouri, 1880-1930. 
Table 1 shows that the city experienced a dramatic population increase during the 
decades after 1880. The total population increased from 55,785 in 1880 to almost 
400,000 by 1930. Black population increased from 8,143 in 1880, to 23,566 in 1910, 
Table 1: Total and Black Population for 
Kansas City, Missouri, 1880-1930 
Percent 
Total Percent Black Percent Black 
Year Population Increase Population Increase of Total 
1880 
1890 
1900 
1910 
1920 
1930 
55,785 
132,716 
163,752 
248,381 
324,410 
399,746 
137.9 
23.4 
51.7 
30.6 
23.2 
8,143 
13,700 
17,567 
23,566 
30,719 
38,574 
67.6 
28.2 
34.1 
30.4 
25.6 
14.6 
10.3 
10.7 
9.5 
9.5 
9.7 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau. Census of Population and Housing. 
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to 38,574 by 1930, the result of the beginnings of the Great Migration of southern 
blacks to northern and midwestern cities from 1915 to 1930 (Jones 1992; Lemann 
1991 ; Marks 1989). During this period, the percentage of blacks living in the city 
declined from 14.6 percent in 1880, to 10.7 percent in 1900, to 9.5 percent in 1920.7 
After the Plessy v. Ferguson decision in 1896 that institutionalized the doc-
trine of "separate but equal" in education, the State of Missouri imposed a ra-
cially segregated school system on a widely dispersed and largely rural African 
American population (Greene, Kremer, and Holland 1993,107-8; Savage 1931). 
Table 2 summarizes total and black school enumeration in Kansas City, Mis-
souri, and the counties surrounding the city on the Missouri side of the state line: 
Clay County, Jackson County (excluding Kansas City, Missouri), and Platte 
County. The Kansas City, Missouri City limits are contained within Jackson 
County.8 
As table 2 shows, as of 1900, African Americans made up about the same 
proportion of school children in rural Clay, Platte, and Jackson Counties. Yet, 
Table 2: Total and Black School Enumeration, 1900-1954 
(Kansas City, Missouri, Clay County, Jackson County 
[excluding Kansas City, Missouri], and Platte County, Missouri). 
Kansas City, Jackson Clay Platte 
Missouri County County County 
1900 
Total Pop. 59,407 
Black Pop. 5,248 
% Black 8.8% 
1954 
Total Pop. 103,085 
Black Pop. 14,527 
% Black 14% 
Percent Change, 
1900-1954 
Total Pop. +76% 
Black Pop. +177% 
10,538 
655 
6.3% 
44,009 
153 
.3% 
5,997 
429 
7.1% 
13,103 
153 
1.1% 
4,871 
351 
7.2% 
4,054 
62 
1.5% 
+318% +118% -17% 
-77% -64% -82% 
Source: Annual Reports of the Superintendent of Public Schools of Missouri, 
1881,1900,1910,1920,1930,1940,1950. X53E.Box200.KC 250. Arthur A. Benson, 
H. Legal Papers. WHMC-KC. 
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from 1900-1954, the percentage of blacks attending schools in Kansas City, Mis-
souri, skyrocketed 177 percent while the total school population increased only 
76 percent. During the same time, the total school population of Jackson County 
(outside Kansas City, Missouri) increased 318 percent while the black school 
population declined 77 percent. Moreover, in rural Clay County, the total school 
population increased 118 percent while the black school population dropped 64 
percent. In Platte County, the total school population declined 17 percent but the 
black school population plunged dramatically, 82 percent. 
The demographic effect of this racially segregated system of schools is even 
more graphic when comparing white and black school enumeration. Table 3 shows 
white school enumeration in Jackson County (excluding Kansas City, Missouri), 
Clay County, and Platte County in Missouri at five year intervals from 1935 to 
1954. 
Table 3: White School Enumeration in Jackson County 
(excluding Kansas City, Missouri), Clay County, and 
Platte County, Missouri. 1935-1954. 
1935 
1940 
1945 
1950 
1954 
Jackson 
County 
14,429 
14,441 
16,082 
32,340 
43,856 
Clay 
County 
7,118 
6,857 
7,443 
9,174 
12,950 
Platte 
County 
3,361 
3,041 
3,914 
2,982 
3,992 
Percent of Loss (-) 
or Gain (+) in School 
Population, 1935-1954 +204% +82% +19% 
Source: Annual Reports of the Superintendent of Public Schools of Missouri, 
1935, 1940, 1945, 1950, 1954. X49A. "School Enumeration in Jackson (Ex-
cluding Kansas City, Missouri), Clay, and Platte Counties, 1935-1954"; X53E. 
"Black School Enumeration as a Percentage of Total Enumeration in Clay, Jack-
son (excluding Kansas City, Missouri), and Platte Counties, 1881-1954." Box 
200. KC 250. Arthur A. Benson, II. Legal Papers. WHMC-KC. 
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As table 3 shows, from 1935 to 1954 the number of white students attending 
schools in Jackson County (outside Kansas City, Missouri) increased from 14,429 
in 1935 to 43,856 by 1954, a 204 percent increase. Likewise, the number of 
white students attending schools in Clay County increased from 7,118 in 1935 to 
12,950 in 1954, an 82 percent increase. The number of white students attending 
schools in Platte County rose 19 percent, from 3,661 in 1935 to 3,992 by 1954. 
For decades, scholars have documented the historically strong African Ameri-
can commitment to education in the face of considerable economic hardship and 
racial discrimination (see Bullock 1967; Inniss 1995; Kantor and Brenzel 1993; 
Walter and Jewel 1996). At the turn of the twentieth century, Booker T. Washing-
ton (1998 [1901], 29-30) drew attention to "the intense desire which the people 
of my race show for education." If it "had not been for the Negro school," ac-
cording to W. E. B. Du Bois (1992 [1935], 667), "the Negro would, to all intents 
and purposes, have been driven back to slavery." In his classic study, An Ameri-
can Dilemma, Gunnar Myrdal (1944, vol. 1,194-5) maintained that "[l]ike many 
other oppressed people, Negroes place[d] a high premium on education," and 
were "stimulate[d] to migrate by a desire for access to more and better schools." 
The experience of African Americans in the Kansas City metropolitan area 
between World War I and 1954 demonstrated the tenacity of that commitment. 
During this era school districts in only six of the sixty-one African American 
settlements in Jackson, Clay, and Platte Counties provided elementary schools 
for African American children, creating pressures for parents either to move to 
areas where schools were located or make their children travel long distances to 
schools. At the secondary level, access to schools was even more limited for 
African American students. Until 1954, Lincoln High School in Kansas City, 
Missouri, and its feeder junior high schools in the city were the only schools in 
the three-county area that provided post-elementary education to blacks. 
Thus, for most of the decades before Brown, Missouri's inter-district system 
of racially segregated schools required African American families who wanted 
their children to receive an education to attend schools in Kansas City. In 1924, 
for example, one Missouri Education Commissioner found that "[o]n account of 
the lack of school facilities in many small towns and rural districts there is a 
desire on the part of negroes to move to larger cities . . . and congested centers," 
an "inclination . . . increasing] from decade to decade."9 Eppie Shields, a life-
long resident whose parents had to pay for him to attend a parochial school in 
Liberty, a rural area in the northeast part of Clay County, moved his own family 
into the Kansas City, Missouri School District in early 1954 because "[t]here 
wasn't any black schools out there, and I didn't plan to go through the frustration 
and problems that my folks did to get . . . my children into school."10 Jimme 
Marie Thomas, a black migrant to the area from Texas, did not consider moving 
to the growing suburban areas of Kansas City during the late 1940s because, 
I planned to have children and I knew in the suburbs that black 
children after they get out of elementary school came into 
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Kansas City for high school, and I certainly didn't want to buy 
a home that would take us probably 15 to 25 years to pay for 
and have to transport my kids into Kansas City when they got 
out of elementary school.11 
While black and white schools were "separate," they were not "equal." Of the 
elementary schools that rural school districts provided for blacks, many were 
dilapidated, infested with rodents, and inadequate for education. In 1929, a Mis-
souri Education Commissioner reported: 
In these schools, if they may be so called, education opportu-
nities are practically non-existent. The typical school is in op-
eration for about six months a year. The teacher, usually 
. . . young and immature . . . , has had little if any training 
above high school and frequently not so much. The building is 
usually a miserable shack totally unfit for human habitation. 
Textbooks and reference books are scarce and usually dilapi-
dated. They are unsanitary, totally unattractive and generally 
unsuitable.12 
In some cases, African American children endured long bus rides past neigh-
borhood schools and over district school boundaries to attend schools in Kansas 
City. Unlike the intense controversies that busing elicited during the 1970s and 
1980s, few blacks or whites protested against busing African American children 
during the 1930s and 1940s. Whites viewed busing as an easy way to segregate 
without maintaining a costly dual school system while blacks saw it as the only 
available means of obtaining an education in an era of rampant racial exclusion. 
School records, newspaper reports, and testimony in the Jenkins v. Missouri case 
suggest that the typical bus ride was anywhere from 20 miles for African Ameri-
can children living within the city limits of Kansas City to 60 miles for African 
American children traveling to Kansas City from rural areas.13 In Kansas City, 
from 1945 to 1954, approximately 100 African American school children from 
Independence, Missouri, were bused each year to attend schools in Kansas City, 
Missouri. African American children living in Park Hill in north Platte County, 
and Pleasant Hill and Harrison in rural Cass County, were transported to the 
KCMSD by bus or private car up to 1954. 
For every child that was transported daily, there were many sent by poor 
families in rural towns to live with relatives in the KCMSD. "[It] was a very 
common practice to move in with relatives or ministers of black churches be-
cause of the gross inconvenience [of having to travel long distances to school]," 
remembered Edward Fields, Associate Superintendent for Kansas City schools 
in 1977, "[i]f you took a figure of 5 or 10 percent of our enrollment in the 1920s 
and 1930s, that might be a low estimate."14 Overall, the inter-district system of 
segregated education in the metropolitan area meant that rural blacks were forced 
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to travel long distances to attend schools or uproot themselves and move to Kan-
sas City to have any reasonable hope for any kind of education. As one local 
resident put it, 
[The segregated school system] affected everyone that was try-
ing to get [an] education. . . . [F]amilies and school children 
that wanted to receive a high school education in this area were 
sent to central Kansas City, which was about the only place to 
get a high school education.... We also know that there were 
areas like North Kansas City that did not maintain elementary 
schools for children. They had to come into Kansas City. Lee's 
Summit closed the elementary school down in 1910. They first 
went to Kansas City then to Independence. Independence 
closed Young High School [in the 1920s]. They came into the 
city In all the areas that did not maintain schools for blacks, 
it had an effect because [blacks] could not live there and have 
any access to education.15 
The process of black in-migration to Kansas City and white exodus to the 
suburbs was reinforced by a wide range of discriminatory mechanisms, espe-
cially the housing policies of the Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC), the 
Federal Housing Administration (FHA), and the Veterans Administration (VA) 
that barred blacks from purchasing homes in the suburbs (Gotham 2002; 2000a; 
2000b; Jackson 1985; Massey and Denton 1993; Quadagno 1994, chapter 4; 
Weiss 1987,151;Abrams 1971,230-37). From the 1920s through the 1950s, the 
Kansas City Real Estate Board (formed in 1900) subscribed to a national code of 
real estate ethics that endorsed the view that all-black and racially mixed neigh-
borhoods were inferior to all-white homogenous neighborhoods (Gotham 2000b). 
During this time, the FHA's Underwriting Manuals referred to the "infiltration 
of inharmonious racial or nationality groups" as "adverse" to neighborhood sta-
bility and advised appraisers to lower the rating of properties in racially mixed or 
all-black neighborhoods (Quadagno 1994, 90-91; Jackson 1985, chapter 11; 
Massey and Denton 1993, 54-55; Helper 1969, 201-16). Although the FHA re-
moved explicitly racist language from its manuals in the 1950s, later manuals 
continued to refer to the necessity of maintaining "homogenous" neighborhoods 
and warned of the risk of "dissimilar" groups as "unstable" and "inharmonious" 
(Federal Housing Administration 1936; 1938; 1947; 1952). In short, the system-
atic housing discrimination by private and public actors, which reinforced the 
state-enforced segregated school system, restricted both the housing and educa-
tional choices of blacks and influenced their decisions to move from rural areas 
to the inner city. 
African Americans migrating from rural areas in Missouri, as in many areas 
of the country without racially segregated school systems, such as Michigan, 
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Indiana, and Iowa, were drawn by jobs to the metropolitan areas but were pre-
vented from settling in the suburbs because of widespread housing segregation, 
which was supported and bolstered by the federal government. Yet part of the 
lure of Kansas City, Missouri, was that the rural school systems available to 
blacks were rudimentary at best and nonexistent at worst. While jobs and eco-
nomic opportunities might pull people into the city, the availability of schools 
would more specifically influence housing choices. In short, discriminatory fed-
eral housing policies and de jure segregated school systems formed a mutually 
reinforcing set of institutional barriers that prevented blacks from participating 
in the suburbanization process that benefitted millions of whites. While the prom-
ise of employment opportunities may have lured blacks to migrate to Kansas 
City, once in the city housing discrimination relegated them to racially segre-
gated neighborhoods, where their children attended racially segregated schools. 
School Segregation and Desegregation 
After Brown, 1955-1977 
The U.S. Supreme Court's historic 1954 Brown v. Board of Education deci-
sion ruled that the "separate but equal" precept of Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) was 
unconstitutional and that state-sanctioned segregated school systems are "inher-
ently unequal." A year later, in Brown II, the Supreme Court ruled that school 
districts should begin desegregating their schools with "all deliberate speed" but 
set no standard or deadline for desegregation to occur. In response, in 1955, the 
KCMSD eliminated explicitly racial attendance zones, replacing them with neigh-
borhood attendance zones. This decision to adopt neighborhood attendance zones 
was based on the State of Missouri's decision to relinquish state control over 
how and where local school districts educated African American children after 
1954. Before the Supreme Court's decision, the education of African American 
children, including their separation from white children, was considered a state 
government responsibility. After Brown, the State of Missouri adopted the policy 
that school desegregation was a matter of local discretion, choice, and control. A 
month after the Brown decision, the Missouri Attorney General ruled that local 
districts "may... permit 'white and colored' children to attend the same schools," 
but left it up to local school districts to decide "whether [they] must integrate."16 
After maintaining a policy of explicit racial segregation in schools for more than 
50 years, the State of Missouri now delegated to local school districts responsi-
bility for remedying the problem. 
Pursuant to the neighborhood attendance zone plan, the KCMSD school 
board eliminated explicit racial school attendance zones and drew new atten-
dance zones using ostensibly non-racial criteria such as building capacity and 
student travel distance. Over the next two decades, from 1955 through the mid-
1970s, the school board made frequent shifts in the attendance areas of its schools, 
typically removing white areas from the western-most portions of its racially 
transitional zones and attaching them to all-white zones farther west. While north/ 
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Map 1: Location of 
High Schools and 
Elementary 
Schools, KCMSD 
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south school attendance boundaries changed often, the east/west boundary along 
Troost Avenue—a major north/south boulevard—remained fairly constant, set-
ting in motion a process of rapid racial transition in neighborhoods and schools 
east of Troost.17 Map 1 shows the location of Troost Avenue in Kansas City 
Missouri, in relation to the Central Business District and various elementary 
schools and high schools south of Interstate 70. 
According to U.S. Census Bureau data, from 1950 through 1970 the number 
of white residents living in neighborhoods east of Troost plunged dramatically, 
declining from 126,229 in 1950 (75 percent of the total population) to 33,804 
(25 percent of the total population) two decades later. In contrast, the number of 
black residents living in this area increased from 41,348 (25 percent of the total 
population) in 1950 to 102,741 (75 percent of the total population) by 1970. The 
overall decrease of 92,425 white residents living in neighborhoods east of Troost 
from 1950 to 1970 was accompanied by an increase of 61,933 black residents 
living in the same area (Gotham 2002, chapter 5). 
Table 4 shows the racial makeup of KCMSD Elementary Schools located 
east and west of Troost Avenue, south of 31st street, at five-year intervals be-
tween 1955-56 and 1974-75. Elementary schools are arranged from north to 
south and located on Map 1. 
As table 4 shows, almost all elementary schools located east of Troost expe-
rienced racial turnover at various times over the two decades after Brown. Linwood 
went from 18.2 percent black in 1955-56 to 89.9 percent five years later while 
Ladd went from 4.7 percent black in 1955-56 to 99 percent black in 1960-1. 
Mann, Kumpf, Meservey, Chick, Willard, Troost, Pershing, Pinkerton, and 
Blenheim elementary schools all went from all white in 1955-56 to over 90 per-
cent black by 1974-75. 
Table 5 shows the population and racial make-up of each KCMSD high 
school, south of 1-70, from 1954 to 1975. From the 1950s to the 1980s two sets 
of high schools were located on either side of Troost (see map 1). To the west 
were Westport and Southwest, to the east were Lincoln, Central, Paseo, and South-
east, each with its own feeder junior high and elementary schools. 
As Table 5 shows, the racial composition of high schools east of Troost 
changed dramatically after 1954. Lincoln, the state-mandated black high school 
before 1954, started out at 100 percent in 1954-55. Central, all white in 1954, 
became more than 90 percent black by 1960-61. Paseo, all white in 1954 and 9.7 
percent black in 1960 became more than 99 percent black by 1970-71. South-
east, all white in 1954 and 1.7 percent black in 1960-61, became more than 97 
percent black by 1974-75. During this period, the schools west of Troost re-
mained predominantly white. Southwest had only .01 percent blacks in 1955 and 
only 0.8 percent in 1970-71. As tables 4 and 5 show, by the mid-1970s, every 
high school east of Troost was more than 90 percent black and sixteen out of 
eighteen elementary schools located east of Troost were more than 90 percent 
black. In contrast, every elementary school and high school west of Troost was 
less than 50 percent black.18 
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Table 4: Racial Makeup of Kansas City, Missouri School District Elementary 
Schools at Five-Year Intervals, 1955-56—1974-75. 
Elementary Schools located east of Troost Avenue, west of the Blue River, south 
of 31st street. 
School 
Linwood 
Ladd 
Moore 
Faxon 
Seven Oaks 
Melcher 
Mann 
Bancroft 
Kumpf 
Meservey 
Graceland 
Chick 
Willard 
Troost 
Pershing 
Pinkerton 
Blenheim 
Marlborough 
1955-56 
% Black 
18.2 
4.7 
2.3 
0.7 
0* 
not open 
0 
0 
0 
0 
28.8 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1960-61 
% Black 
89.9 
99.0* 
45.2 
11.5 
65.1 
0.2 
84.2 
1.2 
62.2 
13.5 
43.4 
10.8 
0 
1.3 
2.7 
0 
0 
0.2 
1965-66 
% Black 
98.8* 
99.8 
72.1 
54.6* 
96.8* 
38.6 
97.9* 
28.5 
96.8* 
76.7 
89.6 
51.2 
7.3 
3.3 
42.7 
18.0 
20.9 
30.6* 
1970-71 
% Black 
99.8 
99.8 
92.6 
92.5 
99.4 
89.9 
99.1 
66.6 
99.4* 
98.2 
99.0 
83.6 
92.2 
42.2 
99.5 
84.3 
53.9 
21.6 
1974-75 
% Black 
98.4 
99.6 
93.2 
95.6 
98.7 
96.7 
98.9 
84.4 
100.0 
97.5 
99.6 
90.8 
98.7 
93.3 
98.7 
94.9 
92.3 
73.8 
Elementary Schools located west of Troost Avenue, east of the Missouri-Kansas 
state line, south of 31st street. 
School 
Longan 
Volker 
Swinney 
Nelson 
Bryant 
Border Star 
Cook 
1955-56 
% Black 
0 
0 
0* 
0* 
0 
0 
0 
1960-61 
% Black 
1.5 
0 
0.5* 
0* 
0 
0 
0 
1965-66 
% Black 
2.7 
0 
18.6* 
1.1 
0 
4.1 
0 
1970-71 
% Black 
4.2* 
5.6 
6.6 
14.6* 
1.1 
8.4 
7.2 
1974-75 
% Black 
10.1 
13.3 
18.8 
41.5 
15.4 
19.7 
25.1 
* Boundary change occurred within the noted five year interval. 
Source: XK2. "Kansas City, Missouri (KCMO) School Districts, Total Enroll-
ment, High School Enrollment, Junior College Enrollment, Elementary School 
Enrollment, 1954-1983." Box 213. KC 250. Arthur A. Benson, II. Legal Papers. 
WHMC-KC. 
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Segregative school actions in this crucial period established Troost Avenue 
as a cognitive racial boundary—later to be referred to by local residents as the 
"Troost Wall"—that real estate "blockbusters" manipulated to stimulate white 
flight from neighborhoods east of Troost Avenue. "Blockbusting" is a practice in 
which real estate agents attempt to move non-white, usually African American 
families, into an all-white neighborhood for the purpose of exploiting white fears 
of impending racial turnover and property devaluation to buy up other property 
on the block at depressed prices (Orser 1994, 4; Feagin 1986; Helper 1969; 
Snow and Leahy 1980). Newspaper reports from the 1950s through the 1970s 
reveal that city council members, neighborhood coalitions, and civil rights groups 
were well aware of the destabilizing effects of blockbusting and panic selling 
(Gotham 2000c). Many residents engaged in intense mobilization efforts, in-
cluding letter writing to state representatives, lobbying of state officials, protests 
at city council meetings, and the formation of vigilant neighborhood coalitions 
to persuade fellow neighbors not to succumb to real estate blockbusting (Gotham 
2002, chapter 5). Yet neither the State of Missouri nor the Kansas City Real 
Estate Board investigated or halted blockbusting or other profiteering real estate 
practices, including racial real estate steering and redlining, that affected south-
east neighborhoods. 
On June 20,1963, a group of African American and white residents staged a 
protest at a KCMSD Board meeting, charging that the district, via its attendance 
zone policies, was reinforcing neighborhood segregation by adopting "the un-
written law of the Troost line" as the boundary separating white and African 
American populations in Kansas City. More protests followed less than a month 
later as the local Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) launched a series of sit-ins 
and pickets at KCMSD Board meetings.19 On July 25, 1963, KCMSD Superin-
tendent, James Hazlett, met with the KCMSD Board to review the Board's posi-
tion on the subject of school integration. Among other things, he proposed that 
the Board "accepts the principle of promoting integration as one of many factors 
to be considered, but it does not believe that priority should be given to this 
above all other factors." On August 1, 1963, the Board adopted a policy state-
ment declaring "that integration is a factor to be taken into account within the 
school system whenever it is possible to do so without destroying the fundamen-
tal principle of the school as a major service unit to the neighborhood of which it 
is part."20 
Throughout the early 1960s, editorials in the local African American-owned 
newspaper, the Kansas City Call, repeatedly condemned the school board's seg-
regative practices, drawing attention to how racially identifiable schools con-
tributed to the maintenance of segregated neighborhoods.21 Early on, the Call 
recognized that segregative school board policies interlocked with the discrimi-
natory activities of local real estate firms and agents to perpetuate Troost Avenue 
as a racially identifiable school attendance boundary. Over the next decade, lo-
cal civil rights groups and a number of neighborhood coalitions including the 
Blue Hills Neighborhood Coalition, the Forty-Nine Sixty-Three Neighborhood 
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Coalition, and the Marlborough Heights Neighbors, staged numerous protests at 
KCMSD board meetings demanding that the school board extend attendance 
zones across Troost Avenue. During this time, the school board repeatedly justi-
fied its segregative school attendance boundary policies on the grounds that 
"neighborhood unity," "neighborhood autonomy," and "neighborhood stability" 
had to be preserved before school integration could go forward. These claims 
provided the justification for changes in school district boundaries, which were 
redrawn dozens of times throughout the late-1950s and the 1960s to segregate 
blacks in schools east of Troost Avenue while maintaining the predominantly 
white composition of schools west of Troost Avenue. Not surprisingly, virtually 
every school the KCMSD built after 1954 opened either all-white or all-black.22 
Until 1976, attendance zones did not cross Troost, despite overcrowding in Afri-
can American schools east of Troost and underutilization of white schools west 
of Troost. Interestingly, the decision to eliminate the Troost Avenue attendance 
boundary came only after the Department of Health, Education, Welfare (HEW) 
sued the district in 1973 to compel it to adopt a comprehensive desegregation 
plan.23 Until 1968, no African Americans served on the school board, and the 
racial composition of the board remained predominantly white throughout the 
1970s. 
During the 1960s, the State of Missouri and the KCMSD board officials 
considered a number of school desegregation measures, including busing, equal-
izing funding across school districts, changes in school boundaries, and student 
transfer policies. However, school board officials refused to implement any of 
the proposed school desegregation measures, and, in the process, allowed atten-
dance patterns to continue on a segregated basis. For example, in 1965, the school 
board rejected recommendations from desegregation consultants to build a se-
ries of integrated middle schools. Three years later, the board refused to endorse 
a proposal by Superintendent James Hazlett to establish a comprehensive system 
of racially mixed schools.24 Also in the 1960s, the school board adopted a dis-
trict-wide busing program to relieve overcrowded conditions at various schools. 
However, the KCMSD's "intact busing" policy had a racially segregative intent 
and effect as school administrators bused African American students to predomi-
nantly white schools but segregated them in demarcated classrooms and did not 
allow them to mix with the white students. Cortez Bradley, a teacher at the Afri-
can American Linwood Elementary School, remembers how he and his class, 
along with five other classes, were bused to the mostly white Douglas Elemen-
tary School for three years and then to the mostly white Humboldt Elementary 
School for the 1965-66 school year: "We stayed intact. We had our own play 
schedules, lunch schedules and so on. We really stuck together and we really 
worked very well together as a team."25 
In response to continued racial segregation both between and within schools, 
a number of civil rights groups mounted protests attacking what they perceived 
as efforts by an intransigent school board to maintain the racial segregation of 
Kansas City school children. In September 1964, a group calling itself the Citi-
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zens Coordinating Committee (CCC) staged a protest at a school board meeting, 
accusing the board of disregarding "the welfare of our children and callously 
ignoring the expressions of concern by apprehensive parents."26 Later that month, 
the school district changed its policy and allowed bused students to mix into the 
regular enrollment. Justifying its actions as implementing the requirements of 
the 1955 Brown //decision to move with "all deliberate speed," the school board 
maintained that the purpose of its new busing policy was to integrate schools "as 
expeditiously as possible," a stance that the Kansas City Call immediately de-
nounced as another "high-sounding phrase which really means 'any old time' or 
'maybe not at all.'"27 More protests followed in 1965, as the CCC and Freedom, 
Inc., a coalition of African American politicians, staged several demonstrations 
at school board meetings. In October 1965, Freedom, Inc. issued a "Black Pa-
per" setting out points of "frustration and discontent" among blacks of Kansas 
City, listing wrongs that should be corrected by local political officials. Accord-
ing to one point in the paper: 
We protest the continuing refusal of the Board of Education to 
provide adequate education facilities; the continuing over-
crowded conditions which the vast majority of Negro children 
are required to seek an education; the continuing refusal to 
appoint qualified Negroes to administrative and supervisory 
positions in the school system; the continuing refusal to assign 
the best qualified teachers to those schools with the greatest 
need; and the aggravation of this situation by transferring the 
best and most skilled teachers to schools and areas where the 
need for their special talents is slight; . . . Freedom Incorpo-
rated and the Negro community will no longer be content or 
silent when we receive only the dregs of the tax dollars which 
we pay for the education of our children.28 
Throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s, opponents of racial mixing in the 
schools, busing, and the elimination of racially identifiable school boundaries 
repeatedly voiced their resistance to school integration and equalization of school 
funding across districts on ostensibly non-racial grounds. For example, in 1969, 
State Representative James Spainhower introduced legislation to equalize school 
funding throughout the state by consolidating small school districts into larger 
regional school districts throughout the state. The objective of the "Spainhower 
Plan," as it became known, was not to promote racial integration but to relieve 
overcrowding in smaller districts and to redistribute educational resources across 
school districts. However, opponents vehemently denounced his plan on the 
grounds that it would exacerbate inequalities between school districts, impover-
ish education in the suburban school districts, and lead to more harm than good. 
Spainhower remembered dozens of conversations with fellow state legislators 
concerning his school equalization proposal in which "there were some things 
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they would talk about with me in private that they would not talk about in pub-
lic." 
Privately they would discuss the detrimental effects upon their 
own political careers if our proposals for school district reor-
ganization were pursued..., that it would compel them to take 
positions which could be harmful to them politically. The ra-
cial question was one which was discussed privately [but] was 
really not discussed publicly. It would cause them to have to 
face up to the issue of integration and they would just as soon 
not face up to that because to them it was a no-win issue.29 
As Spainhower remembered, opponents of the plan perceived it as a policy for 
racial desegregation, though they never explicitly referred to it this way. He re-
called that "generally it was phrased that, 'We like our school district like it is, it 
is doing a good job, we don't want to get part of Kansas City in our school 
district.'"30 
Overall, the use of Troost Avenue as a school attendance boundary, coupled 
with a discriminatory busing system and refusal to implement various desegre-
gation measures, perpetuated a school board policy of de facto school segrega-
tion. The KCMSD's 1955 adoption of "neighborhood" attendance zones in re-
sponse to Brown v. Board of Education was a means to circumvent the Supreme 
Court's ruling and maintain separate white and black schools. The use of such 
"neighborhood" attendance zones meant that racially identifiable schools con-
tinued irrespective of the Supreme Court ruling in Brown. That white schools 
tended to be underutilized while black schools were overcrowded helped rein-
force in the minds of white residents that black schools were inferior and sub-
standard, a claim consonant with the negative stereotypes and prejudices of the 
day. These perceptions formed the bases of individual and collective decisions 
that led to white resistance to school integration and white flight from southeast 
neighborhoods from the 1950s to the 1970s. 
From Jenkins v. Missouri (1977) to 
Missouri v. Jenkins (1995) 
By the early 1970s, the segregative policies of the KCMSD were coming 
under heavy and sustained attack by local civil rights groups such as the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the Congress of 
Racial Equality (CORE), and the Southern Christian Leadership Committee 
(SCLC) and by the federal government.31 In January 1973, the SCLC filed suit 
asking for desegregation of all KCMSD secondary schools.32 A 1974-75 federal 
investigation of the KCMSD by the Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare (HEW) found that the school district had illegally segregated schools, had 
taken actions in the past to perpetuate segregation, and had ignored and passed 
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up previous opportunities to desegregate its schools. Under threat to cut off fed-
eral funds to the district, HEW required that the school board dismantle its Troost 
Avenue attendance zone boundary and establish a long-range and comprehen-
sive plan for school desegregation.33 In 1976, a district task force submitted to 
HEW an integration plan entitled "Plan 6C" that would realign attendance zones 
and bus students until every school within the school district was at least 30 
percent minority. In July 1977, HEW responded that Plan 6C did not "satisfy 
constitutional standards because it would continue a substantially large number 
of schools which are either racially isolated or substantially disproportionate in 
their racial composition." However, HEW could not accept or reject the KCMSD's 
plan because Congress had not yet acted on proposed antibusing legislation that 
affected HEW's powers. School board officials decided to implement Plan 6C, 
and schools opened in fall 1977 with the plan in place.34 
The school board designed Plan 6-C to attract federal money for the finan-
cially starved school district. "I may be the only person in this town that will 
admit that, but that's what it was in the truest sense of the word, the school dis-
trict needed dollars," remembered Emanuel Cleaver, Executive Director of the 
Kansas City branch of the SCLC in 1981 and later mayor. "I don't think any of us 
operated under the assumption that Plan 6C would desegregate the system." When 
board officials implemented Plan 6-C in 1977, eight out of every 10 African 
American children in the district attended schools that were at least 90 percent 
black while the majority of white students attended schools that were more than 
90 percent white. Four years later, enrollment figures showed virtually no sig-
nificant change in the numbers and percentages of African American and white 
students attending KCMSD schools. By 1981, non-whites made up 72.6 percent 
of the district's enrollment, up from 68.6 in 1977-78. White flight continued to 
cripple desegregation efforts as white enrollment plummeted by more than 4,000 
students in four years, declining from 14,207 in 1977-78 to 10,191 in 1981.35 
Racial conflicts over schools reached a crescendo in the late-1970s and 1980s, 
setting the stage for a protracted and bitter controversy over whether the prob-
lem of school desegregation required a local or a metropolitan solution. In 1971, 
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Edu-
cation that school boards could not adopt "racially neutral" student assignment 
plans that relyed on existing residential patterns, because these reinforced racial 
segregation in schools. In Swann the Court ruled that busing was a suitable means 
of desegregation because where schools are located influences patterns of resi-
dential development and has an "important impact on the composition of inner 
city neighborhoods." 
Protest and opposition against Plan 6-C busing plans were widely reported 
in the local Kansas City media. Some white activists and teachers opposed bus-
ing plans, believing that the quality of schools would decline as African Ameri-
can students were bused in from overcrowded black schools. One white resident 
living in Kansas City, Missouri, at the time asserted that "I'm afraid I'm going to 
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sound pompous by saying this but we're paying for our ancestors' sins."36 Mean-
while, civil rights leaders such as Emanuel Cleaver (leader of SCLC), Vertis 
Swinton (NAACP), Alvin Brooks (CORE), and Charles Briscoe (a school board 
official) called for a metropolitan-wide solution to the problem of school segre-
gation. As one African American former KCMSD board member remembered, 
There was one feeling I came into contact that said "you can-
not force this, force integration." The same people, however, 
did not have anything to say about times just a few years be-
fore when we would walk by an all-white school to get to the 
black school, or be bussed by two or three all-white schools to 
get to a black school (Brian Charles. Interview by Author). 
In May 1977, in what would become Kansas City's landmark desegregation 
case, Jenkins v. State of Missouri, the KCMSD sued 18 suburban school districts 
in Kansas and Missouri, the states of Kansas and Missouri, and the federal gov-
ernment. Initially, the school district positioned itself as the plaintiff in the suit, 
claiming that an interdistrict (city/suburban) and interstate (Kansas/Missouri) 
desegregation remedy was necessary to integrate racially isolated city schools. 
In October 1978, the U.S. District Court dismissed the cases against the state of 
Kansas and its suburban districts, and the school district was realigned as a de-
fendant. The case proceeded to trial with a group of plaintiff schoolchildren 
suing both the KCMSD and the state of Missouri and the KCMSD cross-claim-
ing against the state. 
In 1984, the District Court found that a segregated school system "still ex-
ists to a large degree today" in Kansas City and had "impacted blacks in the 
KCMSD and consequently caused public schools to swell in black enrollment" 
{Jenkins v. State of Missouri, 593 F.Supp. 1485 [1984] at 1491). Chief Federal 
Judge Russell G. Clark ruled that the state of Missouri and the KCMSD had 
"violated the Constitution by failing to eliminate vestiges of a racially segre-
gated dual system previously required under law" (593 F.Supp. at 1487). The 
State of Missouri was found liable for causing segregation through its laws and 
other acts that "had the effect of placing the state's imprimatur on racial discrimi-
nation." The school district was castigated for the segregative intent and effects 
of its school attendance boundary changes, its 1960s "intact busing" policy that 
kept black students separate from white students, and its repeated disregard for 
considering integration plans when they were proposed.37 
However, Judge Clark dismissed the suburban school districts from respon-
sibility for Kansas City's segregated school system, finding that "there is no 
credible or substantiated evidence of a constitutional violation by these subur-
ban school districts."38 With this decision, the problem of school desegregation 
was redefined as a local, rather than a metropolitan, problem. Any desegregation 
remedy would have to be accomplished within the geographical limits of the 
KCMSD, rather than through a metropolitan solution. Judge Clark's decision to 
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release the suburban schools from the suit was based on the 1974 Supreme Court 
ruling in Milliken v. Bradley that suburban school districts that did not cause 
segregation could not be forced into complying with a desegregation plan for 
another neighboring city (418 U.S. 6171 [1974]). The Milliken decision for De-
troit was the turning point of school desegregation battles around the nation as 
the Supreme Court, in a narrow 5-4 decision, blocked efforts for inter-district, 
city-suburban desegregation remedies as a way to integrate racially isolated ur-
ban schools (Eaton, Feldman, and Kirby 1996). In this case, the Supreme Court 
erected a heavy burden of proof on the part of the plaintiffs—requiring them to 
show that the suburban defendants had acted in a racially discriminatory manner 
that caused racial segregation in another school district. The Milliken decision 
effectively precluded the option of requiring the predominantly white suburbs to 
help integrate urban school districts with large minority populations, even though, 
as Justice Thurgood Marshall pointed out in his dissenting opinion, this meant 
that because of the highly racially segregated residential composition of central 
cities, racial and economic segregation would only intensify (Wilkinson 1979, 
216-26; Orfield 1978, 31-36; Kantor and Brenzel 1993, 373-77). 
According to Judge Clark's interpretation, there was no evidence that the 
different racial composition between the KCMSD and the suburban schools was 
caused by official activity or collusion between the central city and suburban 
school districts that was tantamount to a constitutional violation. Throughout the 
preceding decades, many suburban Kansas City school districts had participated 
in numerous voluntary inter-district programs ranging from cooperative buying, 
joint data processing, shared facilities, special education, and transfers of stu-
dents. However, they consistently and vehemently refused to participate in any 
inter-district desegregation proposals, ranging from voluntary student exchange 
and district-reorganization recommendations, to the contemplated dissolution of 
the KCMSD in 1975. Moreover, at the insistence of rural and suburban legisla-
tors, in 1957 the State of Missouri passed legislative statute H.B. 171 that per-
manently barred the automatic expansion of school district boundary lines when 
city boundaries expanded through annexation. Interestingly, after 1957, the geo-
graphical size of the Kansas City, Missouri, school district remained basically 
the same while the city annexed over 219 square miles of outlying land, creating 
new school districts for suburban whites. Without the enactment of H.B. 171, the 
KCMSD board officials would have automatically expanded school boundaries 
to become coterminous with city boundaries following annexations in 1958,1959, 
1961, 1962, and 1963. Because of H.B. 171, however, the KCMSD was unable 
to expand into all-white suburban areas to create a more racially balanced school 
district after 1957. 
Moreover, that the Kansas City metropolitan area is split by the state line 
with Kansas made a true metropolitan desegregation difficult. Indeed, not even 
the Milliken case was across state lines, and the historically bifurcated nature of 
the metropolitan area provided for the growth of suburban bedroom communi-
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ties, especially in Johnson County, Kansas, to which Kansas City whites could 
flee.39 Judge Clark's decision to release the suburban school districts from the 
desegregation suit was a decision he would later regret: "The very minute I let 
those suburban school districts out, I created a very severe problem for the court 
and for myself, really, in trying to come up with a remedial plan to integrate the 
Kansas City, Missouri, School District," the chief judge reflected years later. 
"The more salt you have, the more white you can turn the pepper. And without 
any salt, or with a limited amount of salt you're going to end up with a basically 
black mixture."40 In short, although the historic roots of school segregation in 
Kansas City, Missouri, were rooted in interdistrict actions, even Judge Clark 
failed to emphasize them in his decision. Even if Milliken had been decided the 
other way and Judge Clark had ordered an interdistrict remedy in Jenkins, it is 
unlikely that he could have ruled for an interstate remedy across the Missouri/ 
Kansas state line. 
Based on the 1984 district court decision, Kansas City's school desegrega-
tion efforts between 1985 and 1987 focused on rebuilding the KCMSD's schools 
and developing a comprehensive magnet school plan designed to attract subur-
ban white students to the city school district within a system of controlled choice 
(Morantz 1996a). The guiding principle was that Kansas City schools would 
have to be improved substantially, both in image and substance, before whites 
from suburban districts could be persuaded to voluntarily enroll their children in 
the inner city schools (Benson 1995). In 1985, a set of educational improve-
ments were implemented requiring smaller class sizes, more art and music classes 
for elementary students, more teachers and counselors, improved libraries, full-
day kindergarten, before and after school programs, and a series of efforts di-
rected at low-achieving students.41 In 1986, the court ordered that a comprehen-
sive magnet school plan be designed and implemented to attract suburban stu-
dents to the KCMSD in an effort to redistribute students and desegregate schools. 
The court also directed that the State of Missouri pay the costs of renovating 
or replacing all schools in the KCMSD in an effort to remedy the deleterious 
effects of deteriorating educational facilities and to avoid financial bankruptcy. 
After the KCMSD's enrollment had become majority African American in 1970, 
the district's voters, who remained majority white, rejected school funding ini-
tiatives 19 times while schools crumbled and the district faced fiscal insolvency. 
During the two decades after 1970, schools fell into chronic disrepair and dete-
riorated to the point that broken toilets, leaky ceilings, and rodents became com-
monplace in inner city schools. Barbara Schell, a vice principle at Central Middle 
School in 1994, remembered conditions at the Manual Annex school during the 
1970s. 
We would see huge rats. We couldn't keep candy, food, any-
thing in the closets because the rats would eat the candy. It was 
so terrible... . We had leaky roofs. We would freeze to death 
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in the winter.42 
In 1977, a Kansas City Star editorial referred to the KCMSD as "a neglected and 
financially starved entity that is merely awaiting official notice of its death."43 As 
a result of the 1984 District Court order, however, by February 1996, $1.7 bil-
lion had been spent by the school district and the State of Missouri to rebuild the 
district's crumbling schools, a process that in less than a decade brought a dra-
matic facelift to inner-city schools surrounded by poverty, deteriorating neigh-
borhoods, and decaying infrastructure. 
In June 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the central legal tenet of 
Kansas City's desegregation plan, ruling 5-4 in Missouri v. Jenkins that the dis-
trict court had had no authority to order expenditures for the purpose of attract-
ing suburban whites. The majority opinion by Chief Justice William Rehnquist 
said the district court had improperly tried to transform the KCMSD into a mag-
net district to draw white students from surrounding districts without evidence 
that suburban districts had done anything to cause school segregation by violat-
ing the constitution. Specifically, Rehnquist notified the district court that its 
ultimate objective was not to achieve racial integration but "to restore state and 
local authorities to control" of the school district. The majority opinion held that 
once the vestiges of legally enforced segregation were removed, it would not be 
illegal for the school district to maintain and run racially segregated all-black or 
all-white schools. As Justice Clarence Thomas explained, "The Constitution does 
not prevent individuals from choosing to live together, or send their children to 
school together. . . . 'Racial isolation' itself is not a harm; only state-enforced 
segregation is." As long as school facilities are "equal" for all races, Thomas 
said, government has accomplished its goal: "The point . . . is not to enforce 
strict race-mixing, but to ensure blacks and whites are treated equally by the 
State without regard to their skin color."44 
In 1996, Gary Orfield and Susan Eaton ( 1996c, 318) argued that the kind of 
desegregation plan envisioned by the Supreme Court in the Kansas City case— 
i.e., desegregate within the school system and not attract white students outside 
the school district—would make "all schools largely black in a largely white 
metropolitan area and would make no effort to compete with private or suburban 
schools—providing all the ingredients for maximizing white flight." Not sur-
prisingly, by the fall of 1996, the percentage of white students in the KCMSD 
dropped to a record low 22.1 percent as the percentage of minority students 
surged to a record high 77.9 percent. In 1996, the school board officials began 
closing schools, ended free transportation to schools for suburban white stu-
dents, and initiated a series of staff layoffs, thus marking a return to the days of 
fiscal uncertainty and financial turmoil for the poverty-impacted school district. 
In November 1999, U.S. District Court Judge Dean Whipple dismissed the Kan-
sas City, Missouri, school-desegregation lawsuit and refused to block a state 
decision to strip the KCMSD of accreditation. While an appellate panel rein-
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stated the desegregation case in March 2000, in October 2000, the State of Mis-
souri revoked the district's accreditation and effectively ended the state's re-
sponsibility for paying the costs of desegregation.45 
The Supreme Court's 1995 Missouri v. Jenkins decision not only set the 
stage for an end to the Kansas City school desegregation case, but also sent 
ripple effects throughout the nation, as other cities moved to undo mandatory 
court-ordered desegregation (Eaton 1996; Eaton and Meldrum 1996; Eaton, 
Feldman and Kirby 1996; Morantz 1996b). Since the Supreme Court's decision 
in June 1995, school boards and city officials in no less than eleven other metro-
politan areas have begun to dismantle their school desegregation programs. Across 
the state line, the Kansas City, Kansas Board of Education adopted a five-year 
plan in 1996 calling for an end to mandatory busing. In 1996, the Minneapolis 
school board obtained a waiver of state guidelines requiring racial balance in the 
schools. The Indianapolis school board in 1996 began making plans to seek an 
end to the court-ordered busing of more than 5,000 inner-city students to sur-
rounding suburbs. 
In 1997, St. Louis began ending its 15 year court-ordered busing that sent 
12,700 inner city kids to suburban schools. Moreover, school boards in Minne-
apolis, Denver, and Pittsburgh have proposed eliminating busing in favor of re-
turning to "neighborhood schools," many of which would be all-white and all-
black. In Florida, plans are underway to end the 37-year court supervision of 
Hillsborough County schools, while Broward County has abandoned mandatory 
busing. The federal court has ended supervision of desegregation in Wilmington, 
Delaware, and in 1996 Louisville, Kentucky, initiated a reappraisal of its busing 
plan.46 The state of Ohio has asked the federal court to end desegregation in 
Cleveland schools which are at 79 percent minority. In April 2002, the Dayton, 
Ohio, school district settled a NAACP lawsuit from 1972 and has begun disman-
tling court-ordered busing in the city. 
The high court's action on the Kansas City desegregation case and the ac-
tions of local school systems to end school desegregation efforts are based on the 
assumption that school segregation is a past injustice that has been sufficiently 
corrected; thus, federal administrative and judicial involvement is no longer 
warranted as a remedy to what is increasingly seen as a local problem. More 
important, the Supreme Court's Missouri v. Jenkins decision symbolizes and 
reinforces the broader societal shift away from a national concern with the prob-
lems of racial inequality and racially unequal access to education and other re-
sources (Yinger 1995). Like retrenchment in other spheres of federal activity 
including housing provision, civil rights enforcement, and urban aid, the high 
court is withdrawing federal authority for the enforcement of desegregation and 
implicitly reaffirming a return to the "separate but equal" tenet of Plessy v. 
Ferguson (Orfield 1996b, 23-51; Gotham 1998b). 
In the 1960s, the Civil Rights Movement challenged the federal government 
to acknowledge racial inequality and segregation as a national problem and make 
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strides toward alleviating racial injustice and poverty. While racial segregation 
and polarization have remained basic to the fabric of U.S. cities, the federal 
government and the Supreme Court have now surrendered responsibility for ad-
dressing and remedying the social problems of racism and poverty to the local 
level. Federal support and action for racial inequality and desegregation in the 
1960s has seemingly reverted to one of indifference and even hostility in the 
1990s (Orfield 1988; Orfield and Ashkinaza 1991; Edsall and Edsall 1992). For 
Kansas City, as well as the rest of the nation, the federal retreat from desegrega-
tion will likely perpetuate bitter racial divisions and segregated living patterns. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, I have focused on the major themes underlying efforts to rein-
force school segregation, the links between school administrative decisions and 
racial population movement, and the tenacity and persistence of segregation de-
spite the erosion of overt and legally sanctioned discrimination over the last 
three decades. It has been over a century since the U.S. Supreme Court decided 
Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), the landmark case that legitimated public policies of 
"separate but equal." Two generations later, the Supreme Court ruled in Brown v. 
Board of Education (1954) that state-sanctioned segregated schools are "inher-
ently unequal" and ordered that school districts integrate their schools. For de-
cades after Brown, many state governments and school boards throughout the 
nation worked to evade Brown s anti-segregation doctrine. Even after the pas-
sage of civil rights laws, fair housing, and court-ordered busing in the 1960s and 
1970s, school desegregation proceeded at a snail's pace. In the 1970s and 1980s, 
a broad-based conservative backlash against school desegregation gained mo-
mentum and was successful in recasting desegregation as symptomatic of "big 
government" and a threat to democracy and free choice (Fuller and Elmore 1996; 
Orfield and Ashkinaza 1991 ; Edsall and Edsall 1991). Today, the Supreme Court 
under the direction of Chief Justice William Rehnquist has divested Brown of 
much of its scope and reach. As Orfield and Eaton (1996, xv) have noted, "The 
Supreme Court decisions of the 1990s offer instruction not about how to further 
desegregation but how to dismantle it." Indeed, the 1995 Supreme Court deci-
sion in the Kansas City, Missouri school desegregation case, Missouri v. Jenkins, 
requires that desegregation policies be limited in time and extent and requires 
the restoration of local control as the primary goal in desegregation cases. In 
short, by tacitly supporting the "separate but equal" doctrine that Brown out-
lawed, the Supreme Court is embracing a return to unequal public schools (Orfield 
1996b), a trend that is exacerbated by persistent racial inequalities in housing, 
employment, and other areas of American society (Gotham 1998b; Gotham and 
Wright 2000). 
Clearly, the Kansas City case belies any notion that the historical develop-
ment of racial segregation in schools and housing was "natural," accidental, im-
mutable, or caused by remote and uncontrollable demographic forces or migra-
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tion processes. For decades before Brown, the State of Missouri and local school 
board officials—in both Kansas City, Missouri, and the surrounding Missouri 
counties that form its metropolitan area—engaged in practices explicitly intended 
to create and maintain a racially segregated school system in the city. School 
districts in the surrounding counties discriminated against African American stu-
dents in ways that both encouraged and forced the migration of students into the 
racially segregated Kansas City school system. These segregative practices in-
terlocked with intentionally and explicitly discriminatory housing policies and 
real estate practices to create the racially identifiable neighborhoods and schools 
that came to characterize Kansas City (Gotham 2000b). After the Brown deci-
sion, school boundary decisions established Troost Avenue as a racial boundary 
separating white neighborhoods to the west of Troost and black neighborhoods 
to the east of Troost. During this time, the school board wielded the "neighbor-
hood" school policy as a shield with which to ward off claims of intentional 
school segregation leveled by civil rights groups. The KCMSD's insistence upon 
preserving the almost all-white composition of its schools west of Troost made it 
impossible to keep its schools east of Troost racially integrated, putting pressure 
on white families to move out of the area and resulting in virtually complete 
racial turnover in the southeast part of the city (Gotham 2002, chapter 5). 
These school actions were felt throughout the metropolitan area and exerted 
a profound influence on the residential development of the metropolitan area in 
the post-World War II era. Segregative school policies combined with discrimi-
natory public and private housing actions restricted the choices of blacks to in-
ner city housing and schools. In turn, the creation of quality schools in the sub-
urbs combined with new housing primed by FHA and VA housing subsidies ex-
panded the housing and school choices of whites and stimulated them to move 
out of the city. Yet the Kansas City experience is not unique. With slight varia-
tions, what happened in Kansas City and its surrounding metropolitan area dur-
ing the past century occurred in cities throughout the entire country—indeed, in 
almost every metropolitan area where racial minorities have sought to gain ac-
cess to quality education and housing (Massey and Denton 1993). 
Today, the fragmentation of local government, including school districts, 
has powerfully influenced the pattern of racial segregation in metropolitan areas. 
In Kansas City, the existence of the Kansas/Missouri state line exacerbates this 
political fragmentation and, more important, has effectively shut off the option 
of drawing from the heavily white suburbs on the Kansas side of the state line (in 
Johnson County) to integrate city districts. More than two decades ago, Karl 
Taeuber (1979, 158) noted that the system of school districts in a metropolitan 
area "creates and sustains the identification of residential neighborhoods that 
vary in perceived quality. . . . Just as a good neighborhood tends to create and 
sustain a good school, a good school tends to create and sustain a good neighbor-
hood." In Place Matters: Metropoliticsfor the Twenty-First Century, Peter Dreier, 
John Mollenkopf, and Todd Swanstrom (2001) maintain that suburban munici-
palities have become powerful sorting mechanisms for racial and class divisions. 
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Where people live, as Dreier and colleagues point out, has a profound influence 
on the choices people have, the economic resources they have access to, and 
their capacity to achieve a high quality of life. Racial segregation has always 
been America's "dilemma," as Gunnar Myrdal (1944) observed decades ago, 
and the vast racial differences in resources and school financing across metro-
politan areas mean that segregated schools will continue to be unequal schools 
because segregation concentrates poverty and disadvantage (Orfield and Yun 
1999; Massey and Denton 1993). In conclusion, I want to offer three suggestions 
for thinking about school segregation and housing segregation and related con-
temporary social policies in an era where the legal foundations of Brown are 
being quietly eroded, and the federal government's commitment to ending racial 
segregation in schools diminishes. Thinking about these issues helps us confront 
the continuing significance of race and the impact of what George Lipsitz (1998) 
calls the "possessive investment in whiteness" that public policy reinforces in 
today's society. 
First, the Kansas City experience suggests that the impact of schools on 
housing patterns continues to be important, but linkages between the two are 
more subtle and covert today than in the past. Civil rights lawyers in the early 
days of school desegregation routinely proved how school segregation was im-
posed by public agencies and had incremental and segregative effects on hous-
ing patterns (Inniss 1995). Yet court decisions in the 1990s now require civil 
rights attorneys to provide evidence of "overt" and "intentional" discrimination 
on the part of public and private actors and to prove that contemporary segrega-
tion is directly linked to past discriminatory actions. Racial real estate steering, 
racial redlining, and a variety of covert types of housing discrimination continue 
in housing markets and reflect the systemic basis of racial segregation (Gotham 
1998c; Gotham and Wright 2000; Yinger 1998). At the same time, schools have 
become infused with a host of race-coded meanings, serving as a marker of ra-
cial territory, a measure of housing value, and a symbol of neighborhood quality. 
Although race is no longer an explicit exclusionary device, it has become an 
unspoken but tacitly understood element of other seemingly non-racial factors— 
exclusionary zoning, gated neighborhoods, property values, and school qual-
ity—that work together to perpetuate exclusionary practices and mitigate against 
the creation and preservation of racially mixed settlement spaces and schools 
(Gotham 2002; Smith and Feagin 1995; Bullard, Grigsby, and Lee 1994; Feagin 
2001; 1994). Given the interconnectedness of the present and past, and public 
and private action, solutions to school segregation may lie in resolving the deeper 
issues of why racial housing discrimination persists, why race continues to influ-
ence the value and desirability of a school and neighborhood, and why institu-
tionalized patterns of residential segregation remain despite the passage of fair 
housing and a host of anti-discrimination statutes over the last few decades. 
Second, the Kansas City experience suggests that current calls by local leaders 
and conservative policy makers for a return to "neighborhood schools" and "lo-
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cal control" will only reinforce school segregation and exacerbate social inequali-
ties. One of the key claims made by opponents of school desegregation plans in 
Kansas City and elsewhere is that magnet schools and other forms of court-or-
dered school desegregation undermine neighborhood solidarity, undercut the 
power of African American communities, and do more educational harm than 
good for African American students (Allen and Jewell 1996). This assumption 
rests upon a nostalgic view that all-black schools before Brown were sources of 
neighborhood unity and pride, a view that also echoes Justice Clarence Thomas's 
claim that "black schools can function as the center and symbol of black commu-
nities" {Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. At 2065). Yet the desire to return to so-
called "neighborhood schools" ignores that racial segregation in the years before 
Brown meant that African American students were bused out of neighborhoods, 
typically passing white schools to attend segregated and inferior schools. In 1995, 
more than 40 percent of children in the KCMSD changed addresses twice a year, 
a mobility that is common in urban school systems with high concentrations of 
poverty (Benson 1995). Urban poverty, lack of rent money, and periodic unem-
ployment make families highly mobile, thus disrupting school continuity and 
stability (Kantor and Brenzel 1993; Taylor 1996). As school districts around the 
country debate the so-called merits of neighborhood schools and local control, 
we should seriously reconsider the implications and long-term consequences of 
these proposals not only for urban school children, but for the quality of life of 
all U.S. citizens. The corrosive combination of separate and unequal in educa-
tion will likely translate into low levels of academic success, higher dropout 
rates, restricted avenues for upward mobility, deteriorating schools and neigh-
borhoods, and urban disinvestment, among other intense problems (Bankston 
and Caldas 1997; 1996; Bullard, Grisby and Lee 1994). 
A final suggestion is that we direct our attention to the newest battleground 
over school desegregation: the suburbs. As the majority of the U.S. metropolitan 
population has come to live in suburban areas, metropolitan cooperation around 
the issues of housing and school desegregation has proved elusive, and the con-
tinued creation of new suburbs and cities on the urban fringe has been guided by 
efforts to exclude low-income people and racial minorities (Gotham 1998a; Kirp, 
Dwyer, and Rosenthal 1995; Haar 1998; Reardon and Eitle 2000). In The Subur-
ban Racial Dilemma, Dennis Keating (1994) maintains that a crucial mechanism 
maintaining the color-line in housing is suburban opposition to court-ordered 
school desegregation and low-income government-subsidized housing. As the 
case of Kansas City shows, efforts to desegregate schools have often fostered 
racial conflict and contributed to the emergence of a powerful form of defensive 
activism that historian Gregory S. Jacobs calls "educational NIMBY" (Not In 
My Back Yard) (1998, xiii). I suggest that the mobilization of suburban whites 
against school desegregation is a consequence of the perceived threat that state-
led integration efforts have posed to white privileged access to, and control over, 
suburban housing practices (i.e., single-family home ownership, racially exclu-
sive neighborhoods and schools, and so on). Sociologists Susan Olzak (1992) 
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and Lawrence Bobo and James Kluegel (Bobo and Kleugel 1993; Bobo 1983) 
indicate that school and housing desegregation policies can portend substantial 
changes in relationships between racial minorities and whites by bringing these 
spatially isolated groups into contact and competition with each other for access 
to valued resources, such as quality suburban housing and schools. By threaten-
ing to redistribute resources across racial boundaries, school desegregation poli-
cies can upset existing patterns of resource control, destabilize meanings of ra-
cial and class identity, and cause racial conflict. The politics of housing and 
school desegregation in the suburbs are struggles over racial identity, status, and 
resources that link the concerns of home and neighborhood with those of race 
and class. For this reason, schools and housing represent contested space in the 
ongoing competition between racial groups for resources and identity. 
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